

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

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SECOM-M-268

25 May 1983

Minutes
Two Hundred and Sixty-fourth Meeting
Wednesday, 25 May 1983, 1000-1215 Hours
Room 4E-64, Langley Headquarters Building

[REDACTED]
Chairman
Presiding

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MEMBERS. PRESENT

Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy
Mr. Maynard Anderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED] Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Col. George J. Mercuro, Department of the Air Force
[REDACTED] National Security Agency
Mr. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice

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ALTERNATES. PRESENT

Mr. Thomas H. Blankenship, Department of Energy
Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army
Mr. Dan Downum, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Capt. William C. Horn, Department of the Navy
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. Roger D. Smith, Department of the Air Force

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ALSO PRESENT

[REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency (C)
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED] National Security Agency
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency (C)
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency (C)
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State
[REDACTED] Executive Secretary
[REDACTED]

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

1. Asked members to give their personal and timely attention to the memorandum at their places advising of the present need for a chairman of the Physical Security Working Group (PSWG), and the upcoming need to replace []

[] as chairman of the Personnel Security Subcommittee. [] noted that [] had had to withdraw his previous offer of a chairman for the PSWG, and that [] is leaving in August for a year's graduate study. [] asked for nominations for chairmen by an early date. []

2. Advised that members had at their places for information copies of two items of completed SECOM business - the revisions of what used to be DCIDs 1/10 and 1/20. []

3. Asked all present who are involved in planning or scheduling meetings of SECOM subcommittees and working groups to keep the staff advised in advance of all such meetings and of significant subcommittee/group activities. Subsequent discussion focused on a recent call from Captain Boyle of the Capitol Police to [] about an item which had been addressed by the Technical Advisory Group of the SECOM TSCS. This incident, which involved a Legislative Branch political issue, was cited to illustrate the need to keep the SECOM Chairman and staff advised not only of formal meetings, but also of other significant activities. []

4. Noted that SECOM members had unanimously, with one abstention, supported the Army member's March 1983 request that SECOM endorse his position that Army technical/reference libraries which contained significant quantities of intelligence material caveated NOCONTRACT or PROPIN should not be contracted out. []

5. Reported that members were divided on DIA's request for a waiver of DCID 1/7 requirements to permit the [] to receive NOCONTRACT and PROPIN intelligence without case-by-case originator approval. The vote was 8 in favor of DIA's request; 4 opposed; and 1 abstention. [] noted that a SECOM waiver could only be effective if all members endorsed it; hence the request was moot. []

[] He noted that concerns in this area seemed to focus on the length of time it took Community agencies to respond to requests for release authority. DIA fielded the largest number of requests, taking an average of 45 days to do so for collateral data and 35 days for SCI. CIA and NSA had average response times of 35-40 and 30 days respectively. [] suggested that the concerns might be reduced to manageable proportions if the agencies involved could speed up their response times. []

6. Advised that results to date of Congressional review of the FY 1984 SECOM budget were not encouraging. The Senate Select Committee on

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Intelligence voted to cut SECOM's [] request []

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7. Said the first draft of the IG/CM countermeasure organization study, a 146-page document, was being reviewed. [] noted that he was troubled by what subcommittee members have described as incomplete findings and unbalanced recommendations with regard to technical security matters. He stated that in his opinion, the document presents as facts certain views which are controversial. He advised that he had asked TSCS [] for comments which would aid in striking a better balance. []

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8. Advised that unauthorized disclosures were of increasing concern at the policy level. [] said we had prepared a comprehensive set of recommendations on this subject which [] had sent the DCI. He advised that some suggested changes to DCID 1/14 to deal with unauthorized disclosures would be taken up under new business. [] noted that the ISOO continues to address the NSDD-84 task to develop standard nondisclosure forms. [] who attended the 19 May ISOO meeting, reported progress on the SCI nondisclosure agreement, but the State Department opposes prepublication review requirements. []

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9. Invited members to introduce new personnel. [] introduced [] who is succeeding [] as the NSA staffer supporting him on SECOM matters. [] introduced [] as his successor as OSAF member. []

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ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

In the absence of requests for change, the minutes of the 20 April 1983 meeting were approved as written. []

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ITEM 2 Subcommittee Reports

A. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures - [] reported that William Klein, from the Marine Corps, was on board as an instructor for the ITC. He advised that GSA had delayed the start of construction for the addition to the Center to December 1983 or January 1984, and had advised of the possibility of further delay. [] said TSCS was concerned that delay past the end of the year would have adverse impact on the ITC's training program. [] suggested that a letter be prepared for the DCI to send the Administrator of General Services requesting that GSA take early action to accomplish the construction. [] advised that the FBI and the Technical Advisory Group of TSCS were arranging preliminary training for designated Capitol Police officers to prepare them to attend ITC. [] said about 8 of the 12 officers appeared potentially qualified to do proper TSCM surveys for Community agencies testifying on the Hill. He advised that a survey of Community agencies showed that there were about 200 hearings during 1982 which required TSCM support. He advised that the question of whether the Army would provide the Capitol Police some training was still open. []

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[] reported that TSCS held an all-day conference of Community representatives during April to discuss security problems []
[] The object was to develop interim security guidance in the absence of current policy on the subject. []
[] said the TSCS had met to consider the draft IG/CM organizational study. They found it grossly inaccurate, and they concluded that it distorted some earlier TSCS inputs and did not account for some others. He advised that a TSCS working panel has developed a draft paper on the IG/CM report which was reviewed and agreed on by TSCS members. He said TSCS members were asking that IG/CM members use the TSCS paper as the basis for comments on technical security instead of the draft prepared by the IG/CM Secretariat. []
[] asked SECOM members to alert their agencies' IG/CM members to this request.

B. Security Awareness - [] noted that [] was out of town, but had sent a proposed subcommittee charter via the FBI member for SECOM review. Copies were provided members with a request for concurrences or comments. []

C. Computer Security - [] said he agreed with all that had been stated in the meeting about the IG/CM study. He objected to the study's proposal to consolidate technical security functions and to the concept of a "czar" over them. He noted that requirements and circumstances differ markedly for the several disciplines involved, and also differ by department and agency. [] asked if the sense of the SECOM on this study should be made known to the IG/CM. [] said he thought SECOM transmittal of the critical comments of the TSCS and Computer Security Subcommittee would serve that purpose. Mr. Anderson addressed several inaccuracies in the report. [] stated his concern about the report's reflection of a basic philosophy of the IG/CM staff in favor of consolidation of functions. Mr. Anderson agreed, and stated that such an approach undermines the responsibilities of department and agency heads to administer their organizations and programs. []

D. Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations (UDIS) - [] said efforts to implement NSDD-84 were proceeding slowly on four tracks. He discussed ISOO-led efforts to develop nondisclosure agreements, and said the key issue is what should be covered by prepublication review. He advised that the Community's interests seem to be satisfied by general agreement that intelligence data and intelligence sources and methods information should trigger review without the Government having to demonstrate beforehand the sensitivity or classification of the information involved. He noted that study of polygraph use was moving more slowly. He advised that efforts to develop policy on media contacts were proceeding, with no apparent interest shown to date on trying to centralize control. He stated that Justice would consider the offer of UDIS services as one of several options on how to screen disclosures for priority of investigation. [] described Justice comments on the SECOM data base options paper for the IG/CM. He said he disagreed with Justice's concerns about Privacy Act implications and about having the DCI manage the intelligence part of the data base. [] advised that the DCI and the DIRNSA had written the Attorney General about some recent disclosures. []

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[] advised that a new approach to dealing with journalists involved in unauthorized disclosures was not yet in sight. [] asked what consideration was being given to dealing with a well-known columnist's admitted possession of copies of the National Intelligence Daily. [] said the NSA General Counsel had made a strong argument to the Department of Justice that this was a prima facie violation of 18 U.S.C. 798. Justice attorneys responded that they would refer the matter to their policy level. [] discussed the apparent difference in view between SECOM and the IG/CM on data bases. He noted that SECOM's interests focus on obtaining data on disclosures and their circumstances so we could try to keep them from recurring, while the IG/CM's interest is a data base on damage from disclosures. [] and others commented that agencies hurt by compromises were seldom willing to share with others how they had been damaged. Discussion then turned to what data SECOM believes should be kept on unauthorized disclosures. [] noting that previous discussion on the topic had emphasized the desirability of a computerized data base, observed that measurable benefits could probably be obtained from a manual system operated by one person detailed to SECOM for a couple of months to address one or two topics (e.g., which publications are most at risk in terms of disclosures).

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E. Research & Development - [] listed and described the status of FY 1983 SECOM-supported R&D efforts [] In response to a question, he described the current technical surveys of the new U. S. chancery under construction in Moscow.

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ITEM 3 Revision of DCID 1/7

[] noted that members had agreed at the 20 April meeting to change the draft revision of DCID 1/7 to include different language on

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ORCON controls, the third agency rule, and the definition of intelligence information. He stated that the Compartmentation Subcommittee's memorandum reporting the results of their review of DCID 1/7 policy on release of intelligence to contractors had been sent to members with the agenda.

[] noted that the subcommittee had unanimously voted not to change policy so as to permit Federal Contract Research Centers to receive controlled intelligence without originator approval, and had agreed to other changes. Those were to tighten language in the DCID to remove any ambiguity on releasability to contractors of PROPIN material, and to amend the language setting policy on contracting of support services when this would result in loss of Government control over intelligence or too much contractor access.

[] asked for comments on the proposed changes. Members agreed to the new language on PROPIN, subject to inclusion of a one-word change suggested [] Mr. Anderson proposed two changes to paragraph 4 of the appendix concerning contractor release. Members agreed to the new language with Mr. Anderson's changes. Mr. Blankenship advised that the new language on release to contractors was sufficiently flexible to be acceptable to the Department of Energy. [] said the draft revision would be forwarded for policy concurrence and issuance as soon as possible. []

ITEM 4 Demonstration of Copy-proof Paper

After the formal meeting adjourned [] demonstrated for those who remained a copy-proof paper developed with private funds [] Corporation. This involves use of a special paper (costing about 10¢ a sheet) to make authorized copies of sensitive documents. The copies made on red-tinted paper cannot be copied in legible form by any known type of copy machine. No modifications need to be made to machines. The authorized copies are easily readable on small, portable light tables. Members wishing more information on this should contact []

ITEM 5 New Business

1. [] invited attention to copies at members' places of suggested changes to the SECOM-agreed draft revision of DCID 1/14. He said these superseded an earlier version that had been LDX'd to some members earlier. He stated that the changes were intended to give specific effect to increasing concerns at the policy level about persons who abuse the conditions of their access by making unauthorized disclosures of classified information. In particular, the proposed change would emphasize to all concerned that there may be adverse, personal consequences for those culpable of unauthorized disclosures. Mr. Anderson criticized the proposal, and said DoD attorneys were likely to object to it. He and [] exchanged views on the subject. [] asked if further qualification on the likelihood of adverse consequences would make the proposal more acceptable. Mr. Anderson said he would have to check. [] said we need to ensure that the language of the proposal doesn't lend itself to being interpreted as a per se bar, but added that he thought it was an appropriate item which belonged in DCID 1/14. Mr. Rubino cited questions he had had from judges in "Graymail Act" cases who wanted to know the policy authority for denying SCI accesses. He said it would be very helpful to have this proposal included in DCID 1/14.

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[redacted] asked members to review the proposal and provide responses to him by 3 June 1983. [redacted]

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2. Mr. Anderson summarized the results of a recent visit he, [redacted] made to the U. S. Army's Polygraph School at Ft. McClellan, Anniston, Alabama. This was in connection with possible use of that school to train operators who would use the polygraph in personnel security screening. Cost estimates are being obtained on expansion of the facility to accommodate more students. [redacted] said he was very impressed by his visit. [redacted]

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ITEM 6 Next Meeting

[redacted] scheduled the next regular meeting for 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 29 June 1983, in Room 4E-64, Langley Headquarters Building. [redacted]

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Executive Secretary